An Analysis and Simulation of a Novel Auction-Based Pricing Mechanism for Network Services Juong-sik Lee Boleslaw K. Szymanski Network Service Bidder Drop Control Pricing This paper studies pricing mechanisms for short-term contracts for network services in a recurring auction with sealed bids. We propose and evaluate a novel winner selection policy in such an auction. The new approach was motivated by an observation that in a recurring auction enough customers must be willing to participate in future auction rounds to prevent the collapse of prices. Using a simulation, we compare the proposed mechanism with traditional ones. The results demonstrate that the new method increases revenues of the network service provider, minimizes the loss of fairness, and enlarges the stable customer base. Department of Computer Science, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY cs-05-02
An Analysis and Simulation of a Novel Auction-Based Pricing Mechanism for Network Services
Juong-sik Lee
Boleslaw K. Szymanski
Network Service
Bidder Drop Control
Pricing
This paper studies pricing mechanisms for short-term contracts for network services in a recurring auction with sealed bids. We propose and evaluate a novel winner selection policy in such an auction. The new approach was motivated by an observation that in a recurring auction enough customers must be willing to participate in future auction rounds to prevent the collapse of prices. Using a simulation, we compare the proposed mechanism with traditional ones. The results demonstrate that the new method increases revenues of the network service provider, minimizes the loss of fairness, and enlarges the stable customer base.
Department of Computer Science, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY
cs-05-02